Volcker Op-Ed

Paul Volcker published an Op-Ed in the NYT over the weekend, describing what he thinks we need to do about regulatory reform on banks. Summary:

• Prevent commercial banks from running hedge funds and proprietary trading desks.
• Create a government-run "Resolution Authority" that can intervene and safely shut down a bank that threatens the stability of the financial system, and make sure that stakeholders such as stock-owners, management, and bondholders pay the costs of the shut down (no more public safety net, reducing the moral hazard issue).
• No arbitrary size limits (an idea Simon Johnson has championed) that would artificially prevent an institution from becoming "too-big-to-fail". Instead, as noted above, institutions that fail would do so safely and not at public cost.

I quote the conclusion of the editorial:

I am well aware that there are interested parties that long to return to “business as usual,” even while retaining the comfort of remaining within the confines of the official safety net. They will argue that they themselves and intelligent regulators and supervisors, armed with recent experience, can maintain the needed surveillance, foresee the dangers and manage the risks.

In contrast, I tell you that is no substitute for structural change, the point the president himself has set out so strongly.

I’ve been there — as regulator, as central banker, as commercial bank official and director — for almost 60 years. I have observed how memories dim. Individuals change. Institutional and political pressures to “lay off” tough regulation will remain — most notably in the fair weather that inevitably precedes the storm.

The implication is clear. We need to face up to needed structural changes, and place them into law. To do less will simply mean ultimate failure — failure to accept responsibility for learning from the lessons of the past and anticipating the needs of the future.

UPDATE: Volcker vs. Volcker.

Accusations Against the Fed

To be honest, I don't quite understand this one. Can someone explain to me whether the conclusion in this article is true (namely, that the Fed is acting in violation of the Constitution)?

It had generally been assumed that the AIG payouts of 100% on credit swaps (when the insurer was under water and bankrupt companies do not satisfy their obligations in full) was the result of some gap in oversight plus traders at AIG exercising discretion (they were unhappy about bonus rows and had reason to curry favor with dealers, who were potential employers).

The article makes clear that AIG had been negotiating to settle on the swaps prior to getting aid from the government, and was seeking a 40% discount. The Fed might not have gotten that much of a discount, but there was clearly no need to pay out at par.
...
After less than a week of private negotiations with the banks, the New York Fed instructed AIG to pay them par, or 100 cents on the dollar. The content of its deliberations has never been made public.
...
As Vickrey indicates, the fact that this was a backdoor rescue means the Fed is acting as an extra budgetary vehicle of the Treasury. This is a violation of the Constitution and shows how patently false the Fed’s claims of independence are.

Onto other reading...

• David Brooks with some more criticism of the idiotic government decision to police pay and whatnot:
  
  

  Now in disgrace, Wall Street firms are rewriting their rules, but the Obama administration has decided it should take control of compensation reform. Nobody seriously believes high pay caused the financial meltdown; it was bubblicious groupthink. But cutting executive pay just polls so well. ...
  Treasury officials are now making individual pay-package decisions across an array of different companies — and they must have really big brains to understand the motivational psychology of all those different people. The Federal Reserve, meanwhile, has decided to police banks and veto pay deals that lead to excessive risk. Those experts must have absolutely gigantic brains if they can define excessive risk years before investments pay off.
  ...
  The best and the brightest in government are now rewriting existing pay contracts and determining that certain firms will be compelled to pay much less than their competitors. They’re not leveling the playing field, as a humble government would do. They’re making it less level in complicated ways.
  
  

• A case for big banks, and a rebuttal.
• A really interesting read on the dollar.
• On the new tools of monetary policy:
  
  

  Participants in this session were asked to address two basic questions. The first is whether the Fed's targeted liquidity operations were necessary and effective. My answer is probably yes, though I would have a hard time persuading someone if they were not already convinced of that. The second question is whether such operations should be considered an important part of central banks' arsenal of tools in the future. To that my answer is categorically no. From virtually any perspective of our current problems, it would have made far more sense to address these problems with proper regulatory supervision prior to the crisis instead of targeted liquidity operations after the crisis unfolds.
  

  
  
  
  

This Isn't Needed Regulation

I'm appalled by what the government is up to right now.
In case you haven't heard, the Pay Czar, Kenneth Feinberg, just started instituting pay cuts at Wall St. firms that used TARP money:

Mr. Feinberg, the Treasury Department's special master for compensation, will lower total compensation for 175 employees at seven firms including AIG, Citigroup, Bank of America and GM, by an average of 50%, people familiar with the matter said. He will also demand a series of corporate-governance changes at the firms, including splitting the positions of chairman and chief executive officer; requiring boards of directors to create a committee to assess risk, and eliminating staggered boards.

Some of that actually sounds not so bad, such as splitting the positions of chairman and CEO. However, this is not the way to go about fixing anything! What is Feinberg trying to accomplish? Here's the best I've found:

Summers said Feinberg's rulings -- which are expected to be publicly released in the coming days -- will ensure taxpayers' interests come before those of shareholders and incumbent management at the beleaguered firms.

Let's do a quick history. First of all, lest we forget, the government forced these companies into accepting bailout money. Some argue that hey, if you take public money, you have to be prepared for public oversight ... but they didn't have a choice! Beyond that, it's not as if there were any particular requirements associated with the TARP money. For example, one way to look out for taxpayers might have been to get the banks taking TARP money to lend more, during a time when credit was/is tight. Did that happen? No. "Geithner did not require the Big Banks to loan money for commercial loans as a prerequisite for additional borrowings from the Fed."
And now Obama & Co. start trying to trim their pay? What are they accomplishing?? All that I'm seeing here is this: Dear Big Banks, if you get in trouble, we'll give you tons of money. In fact, we might even force it down your throats, but at least no matter how bad you screw up you know you won't go under. Then we'll let you do whatever you want with that money and achieve mind-blowing profits during a recession, which will naturally lead to fantastic compensation and plenty of public outrage. And since we used to work on/with Wall Street, we could basically predict all this would happen. And it's kinda messed up that we used to work with you and now we're giving you more-or-less free public money, but hey, that's what friends are for! But look, we'll have to pretend to be totally bewildered and fake some anger at you so the public doesn't tar-and-feather us.
Honestly, as far as I can tell, that's more or less the story so far. Ugh. Instead of focusing on useful policies that might prevent future issues (such as reinstatement of the Glass-Steagall Act, or something similar, which is sadly looking like it won't happen), they do worthless stuff that won't even really have a lasting impact:

Pay is the wrong way to tackle this problem. It’s a lazy, crowd-appeasing, intellectually dishonest approach. The out of line pay is a symptom, and any attempt to treat symptoms as causes is likely to be ineffective, more likely dysfunctional.
...
Now why is trying to control this through pay not such a hot idea? First, one hundred years of performance appraisal systems have proven them to be abject failures (aa 1992 paper by
Patrick D. Larkey and Jonathan P. Caulkin, “All Above Average and Other Unintended
Consequences of Performance Appraisal Systems,” did a brilliant job of dissecting why, but it was too heretical to get published. You can read a few key points here in the section “The Illusion of Meritocracy”). Second, comp systems are supposed to solve what is called a principal-agent problem. You the person hiring someone to work on your behalf wants to make sure they are operating in accordance with YOUR best interests in mind, not theirs.
But what did we learn from 20 years of executive rewards schemes that had lots of equity incentives that would supposedly align the interest of top brass with that of shareholders. We got instead an explosion of CEO pay and companies that are so fixated on quarterly earnings that they are reluctant to invest in growth. How did that come to pass?
BECAUSE THE AGENTS AND NOT THE PRINCIPALS DESIGNED THE PAY SCHEMES!  The foxes were running the hen house. Oh, sure, we had some fig leaves, it was the HR department that hired the compensation consultant, and the board (nominated by the incumbent management) that signed off on it, but it is pretty clear that a comp consultant that did not deliver a CEO-wallet-fattening plan was unlikely to get much repeat business.
And is anything going to be materially different? No. The conventional wisdom is that having employees take a high level of pay as equity is a magic solution, conveniently forgetting that Bear and Lehman both featured very high levels of shareholding among its top management and employees. Feinberg is only intervening in outliers, to collect a few scalps. He is in a very difficult position and is trying to make the best of it.
The financial services industry now has an unimaginably rich deal: privatized gains and socialized losses, and with tons of leverage too, which amps up the apparent profits and hence the pay levels these looters can claim they deserve. The way to attack this problem is to constrain the level of risk assumption. That in turn requires understanding the products and the markets, something the authorities have completely abdicated. With so much “talent” looking for jobs, now would be the perfect time to invest in catching up.

Sorry for the angry, poorly-written rant. And please keep in mind, I'm not exactly trying to defend banks here. In fact, I think I've been quite open on this blog about how immoral they've been and how dangerous they are to our country as they're currently constructed. The point here is, nothing useful is being done to correct this! All this Pay Czar junk is just political maneuvering. Real reform is not happening.

Weekend Reading

• Ben Friedman, a professor of economics at Harvard, essentially questions the value of financial engineering. Not that this is anything new, particularly since the recent crash, but it is a question worth considering. A lot of his contentions themselves are questionable, but I encourage you to read the entire piece. Some relevant quotes here: "For years, much of the best young talent in the western world has gone to private financial firms. At Harvard more than a quarter of our recent graduates who have taken jobs have headed into finance. The same is true elsewhere. ...At the individual level, no one can blame these graduates. But at the level of the aggregate economy, we are wasting one of our most precious resources. While some part of what they do helps to allocate our investment capital more effectively, much of their activity adds no economic value. ... What makes a more efficient financial system worthwhile is not just that it allows us to achieve greater production and economic growth, but that the rest of the economy benefits. ... Does the increased efficiency our investment allocation system delivers meet that hurdle? We simply do not know. ... It is time for some serious discussion of what our financial system is actually delivering to our economy and what it costs to do that."
• A logical follow-up, though not directly related: Business Week calls for a return to scientific innovation as our primary driver of economic growth. Again, nothing revolutionary, but nice to hear. As an engineer, I naturally tend to agree with such a view. However, IBM is already going international with such efforts, in ways previously unseen.
• The Economist takes a critical look at Chinese stock markets, more or less saying that the market doesn't seem to reflect fundamentals. I have to say, our stock markets don't seem to either.
• Remember when important people said we shouldn't have banks that are too big to fail? Guess what: those banks have grown even bigger!
• Barney Frank and Ron Paul want to audit the Fed, and I'm all for it. It seems to be amazingly difficult to pull off, however. Did you know the Government Accountability Office has no power to do so? What the heck?
• A response to Paul Krugman's claim that $9 trillion of projected debt is not that big a deal. In turn, Krugman respectfully defends his position. At face value, I think $9 trillion sounds pretty scary. Both sides present good arguments as to why it is and is not.
• Solar panels getting more affordable. I think this is an interesting piece: plenty of people could benefit from adding solar energy to their homes when factoring in lowered prices and federal incentives.
• This just can't be good: a state government garage sale. It reeks of desperation, but it's a good idea.