It had generally been assumed that the AIG payouts of 100% on credit swaps (when the insurer was under water and bankrupt companies do not satisfy their obligations in full) was the result of some gap in oversight plus traders at AIG exercising discretion (they were unhappy about bonus rows and had reason to curry favor with dealers, who were potential employers).
The article makes clear that AIG had been negotiating to settle on the swaps prior to getting aid from the government, and was seeking a 40% discount. The Fed might not have gotten that much of a discount, but there was clearly no need to pay out at par.
...
After less than a week of private negotiations with the banks, the New York Fed instructed AIG to pay them par, or 100 cents on the dollar. The content of its deliberations has never been made public.
...
As Vickrey indicates, the fact that this was a backdoor rescue means the Fed is acting as an extra budgetary vehicle of the Treasury. This is a violation of the Constitution and shows how patently false the Fed’s claims of independence are.
Onto other reading...
- David Brooks with some more criticism of the idiotic government decision to police pay and whatnot:
Now in disgrace, Wall Street firms are rewriting their rules, but the Obama administration has decided it should take control of compensation reform. Nobody seriously believes high pay caused the financial meltdown; it was bubblicious groupthink. But cutting executive pay just polls so well. ...
Treasury officials are now making individual pay-package decisions across an array of different companies — and they must have really big brains to understand the motivational psychology of all those different people. The Federal Reserve, meanwhile, has decided to police banks and veto pay deals that lead to excessive risk. Those experts must have absolutely gigantic brains if they can define excessive risk years before investments pay off.
...
The best and the brightest in government are now rewriting existing pay contracts and determining that certain firms will be compelled to pay much less than their competitors. They’re not leveling the playing field, as a humble government would do. They’re making it less level in complicated ways.
- A case for big banks, and a rebuttal.
- A really interesting read on the dollar.
- On the new tools of monetary policy:
Participants in this session were asked to address two basic questions. The first is whether the Fed's targeted liquidity operations were necessary and effective. My answer is probably yes, though I would have a hard time persuading someone if they were not already convinced of that. The second question is whether such operations should be considered an important part of central banks' arsenal of tools in the future. To that my answer is categorically no. From virtually any perspective of our current problems, it would have made far more sense to address these problems with proper regulatory supervision prior to the crisis instead of targeted liquidity operations after the crisis unfolds.
No comments:
Post a Comment