End of Year Reading

• Zerohedge summarizes a Bank of America study on the past and upcoming decades of Asian economics and how they impact the US.

  The financial crisis delivered a clear verdict, in our view, on the limits to the Asian growth model. It no longer makes sense to pursue double-digit growth by lending cheaply to the US consumer.
  Yet change would require less reserve accumulation or – put another way – allowing the currency to appreciate against the US dollar, to which it is now effectively pegged. China needs to manage this “exit” carefully. Moving too fast risks a dollar crisis, with a disorderly drop in the US dollar and a spike in US bond yields. Moving too slow risks a boom-bust cycle in China, with capital inflows and strong monetary growth rates putting upward pressure on asset prices and inflation.

• This is an amazing read on China, written by Christopher Hayes at The Nation. One of the summary paragraphs is particularly interesting, and I quote it below, but I strongly recommend you read the entire article.
  

  We tend to view China as posing an alternative and threatening model for the future, one that's by turns seductive and repulsive, the source of envy and contempt. But after a while I wondered if we aren't in some way converging with our supposed rival. China has managed the transition from a repressive, authoritarian, impoverished country to an industrial, corporatist oligarchy by allowing a loud and raucous debate while also holding tightly onto power. Perhaps we are moving toward the same end from a democratic direction, the roiling public debate and political polarization obscuring the fact that power and money continue to collect and pool among an elite that increasingly views itself as besieged on all sides by a restive and ungrateful populace.

• The title says it all: Why market sentiment has no credibility. Good read at FT.
  
• I don't know who John Kozy is, but I like this paragraph he wrote in his article titled, "The Long Decline of the American Economy":
  

  Ideally, companies exist to provide products and services to people. If the products and services are good, the companies prosper; if they aren't, the companies fail. That's risky, so American companies inverted this model. They fed the public the notion, which has rarely been questioned, that a company's responsibility is solely the financial welfare of its stockholders. Products and services are no longer the goal of business; they are merely means to profit. That reducing quality leads to greater profits quickly became evident. One fewer olive in each jar, one flimsy part in a complex device, one inefficient procedure in a manufacturing process, built-in obsolescence, built-in short product life-cycles, engineered high failure rates. The American quality standard became, "Junk"!

• An excellent argument for a surtax on millionaires, which does a good job of countering an argument I myself believe: that unlimited income potential (where a surtax limits said income potential) is a great motivator for innovation, entrepreneurship, and general hard work. Also, I really like the reasons behind the title of the blog.
  

  The third thing it also might change is the pay that CEOs get. For example, if the top tax bracket were 99%, for all income over $5 million, tax opponents always describe this case as having the effect that people will just stop working after they get to $5 million. That's just not an option for the likes of Peyton Manning, however. What Peyton Manning (or any corporate CEO in the same position) would likely do, however, is settle for just $5 million a year, since all income after that goes to the state. Then, once you get a Republican in office, and they cut that 99% top bracket from $5 million-plus to $25 million plus, Peyton Manning will renegotiate his salary up to $25 million, even though he's still playing 16 NFL games a year...
  So, in this case, tax rates down implies total taxes collected from Peyton Manning up but total "production" from Peyton unchanged, but worsening inequality for the economy and less taxes paid for someone else. So, we'd need to look at whether the consumption spending of people like Tiger Woods, CEOs with their corporate jets, and investment bankers is better for long-run economic growth than the spending of the poor, who spend a large chunk of their disposable income on things such as education and health care...
  This is essentially what has happened in the US, and that is why you shouldn't believe it when economists tell you we shouldn't tax millionaires.
  

More Reading

• The WSJ has put together its second annual "Future of Finance" convention. There is far too much to link, but here's the summary and the main page. It was, of course, heavily populated by private-sector representatives, so the summary shouldn't be too surprising:
  

  Their recommendations acknowledge the need for a stronger role for government regulators. At the top of their list was a call for increasing the capital that financial institutions must hold, with higher requirements for institutions posing greater risks to the system. Second on the list was a call for the Financial Stability Board to impose toughened regulatory standards across nations.
  
  The financiers, however, shied away from other, more intrusive government actions. They rejected a proposal requiring institutions to get regulatory approval before selling innovative new products. They steered clear of proposals that would force institutions deemed "too big to fail" to divest certain businesses. And they dodged the explosive issue of compensation.
  
  That led one ex-regulator, former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker, to chastise the group for not going far enough. "Wake up, gentlemen," he said. "Your response is inadequate."
  
  But the prevailing sentiment of the largely private-sector gathering was that, while strengthened regulation is clearly needed, there is also a significant risk of overreaction. As hedge-fund manager and philanthropist George Soros warned: Markets fail, but regulators fail as well.
  

• Thankfully, Paul Volker was there, and he had some (in my view) encouraging things to say:
  

  I hear about these wonderful innovations in the financial markets, and they sure as hell need a lot of innovation. I can tell you of two—credit-default swaps and collateralized debt obligations—which took us right to the brink of disaster. Were they wonderful innovations that we want to create more of? You want boards of directors to be informed about all of these innovative new products and to understand them, but I do not know what boards of directors you are talking about. I have been on boards of directors, and the chance that they are going to understand these products that you are dishing out, or that you are going to want to explain it to them, quite frankly, is nil. I mean: Wake up, gentlemen. I can only say that your response is inadequate. I wish that somebody would give me some shred of neutral evidence about the relationship between financial innovation recently and the growth of the economy, just one shred of information.
  

  Here's my favorite part of what he said:
  

  I think that I am probably going to win in the end.
  

  The Baseline Scenario summarizes his position perfectly: "Volker wants tough constraints on banks and their activities, separating the payments system – which must be protected and therefore tightly regulated – from other “extraneous” functions, which includes trading and managing money." I must add, I am very very encouraged by his statement that he believes he will "win in the end." I very much hope he is accurately assessing his impact on swaying Obama, and politicians in general, to make some more fundamental reform.
• Another interview with Volker, from a German paper. Nice to see an international perspective. Volker says the same as what he was saying in WSJ's conference:
  

  SPIEGEL: You have been clear about your ideas. Do you really believe we have to break up the big banks in order to create a more sustainable financial system?
  
  Volcker: Well, breaking them up is difficult. I would prefer to say, let's just slice them up. I don't want them to get heavily involved in capital market activities so my view is: Hedge funds, no. Equity funds, no. Proprietary trading, no. Trading in commodities, no. And that in itself would reduce the size of the big banks. So you get some reduction in size. Equally important, you make them more manageable and easier to deal with if they do get in trouble.
  
  SPIEGEL: Banking should become boring again?
  
  Volcker: Banking will never be boring. Banking is a risky business. They are going to have plenty of activity. They can do underwriting. They can do securitization. They can do a lot of lending. They can do merger and acquisition advice. They can do investment management. These are all client activities. What I don't want them doing is piling on top of that risky capital market business. That also leads to conflicts of interest.
  

• Financial Times has a really interesting post from GS about China's exchange rate, essentially saying GS is no longer convinced that China is artificailly screwing exchange rates. Also, GS is saying that Chinese domestic consumption is skyrocketing. This is really, really interesting, and flies in the face of popular economic commentary. In the long run, this could be a very good thing, assuming it's correct. I don't know if you guys can read it though - it's probably behind a paywall that I am lucky to bypass: my employer gives me access to FT. I really wish stuff like this was freely available!
• Perhaps we need to change BRIC to BIC.
• There's been lots of talk about regulating, or reducing the power of, the Fed. FT (again, likely behind a paywall) writes that the Fed must be protected. Note that I do not quote this, or the previous FT link, because they are behind paywalls. Again, wouldn't it be nice if it was free? Then I could quote and discuss here properly. This is one of the reasons I rarely link them - why bother when the people I know who read this don't care to pay for access? For the record, one can subscribe free and access a whopping 10 articles a month...
• Krugman writes about Samuelson, who passed away Sunday. He was one of the great theoretical economists. He wasn't a Marx or Keynes, both of whom drove a philosophy that altered the world, but he had a tremendous impact on the field of economics itself. He was one of the first to make economics a quantitative field.
• Not sure if I already posted this: Goldman does something truly interesting. They are giving their top 30 executives bonuses in the form of stock that cannot be exercised for 5 years, amongst other interesting changes. This is a very fundamental change in bonus structure that is being done without any kind of formal regulation or law. I wonder if other banks will follow suit. This would be a tremendous step in the right direction. EDIT: Yes, I posted it in my previous "Reading" post, but it bears mentioning again.
  

Robert Brenner Insight

Robert Brenner is a historian at UCLA. My dad recently pointed me to a paper he wrote that has some fascinating analysis of the root causes of where we are today, economically. The title of the paper, in my mind, is somewhat misleading - so for those of you who are sensitive to any perceived attack on modern banking, please keep reading it. Since it's a 74 page paper, however, I would point you also to this article, which does a great job of summarizing Brenner's paper.
My (preliminary and probably poorly thought-out) understanding of his analysis is that we're locked into a strange loop in which East Asian countries have been, since the 1960's, purposefully forcing over-capacity in manufacturing, which causes downward prices, profit margins, and wage pressure internationally. However, this downward pressure affects the very consumers they intend to sell to, so they simultaneously prop up those consumers (mostly, the United States, and I imagine Europe to a lesser degree) by buying up debt (emphasis mine):

Japan had, from the mid 1950s on, deliberately staked its prosperity on the construction of excess global capacity in a series of key industries beginning with textiles and marching up the value-added chain from ship building and steel through machine tools, a wide range of consumer durables, and capital equipment, as well as a host of important upstream components. Japan did not launch industries. Rather, it targeted markets that were already served by existing capacity in other countries. Japanese companies built their own capacity to capture these markets and then, backed by patient financing and enjoying the advantage of an undervalued currency with predictable labor costs and meticulous attention to quality control, flooded global markets with “torrential rain-type exports” to quote a Japanese government term. The result was to destroy profitability in these industries, forcing foreign competitors either to abandon the industry in question or to cut costs drastically – most commonly, by shifting production to low wage, developing countries.

Subsequently, in its momentous shift away from the Stalinist economic model of autarkic industrialization, China would follow the road blazed by Japan: the deliberate creation of overcapacity in targeted industries aimed at the global market and with the necessary cheap financing overseen and/or organized by the state. Deng Xiaoping's visit to Japan in 1978 – the first ever by a de facto head of the Chinese government – may well be the most important foreign trip ever made by a Chinese leader.

These two countries – and the smaller economies of East and Southeast Asia that followed in their wake ¬– could not, however, escape the consequences of their systematic creation of overcapacity and the resultant decline in manufacturing profitability. To save the global system on which they themselves had come to depend, they were forced to turn around and provide the waves of credit that permitted the financial lynchpin of the global capitalist system – the United States ¬– to continue to act as the world's primary engine of demand.

As Brenner notes in discussing how the explosion in deficits by the George W. Bush administration was financed, “... Japanese economic authorities saved the day by unleashing an unprecedented wave of purchases of dollar-denominated assets. Between the start of 2003 and the first quarter of 2004 ... Japan's monetary authorities created 35 trillion yen, equivalent to roughly one percent of world GDP, and used it to buy approximately $320 billion of US government bonds and (the debt of government-sponsored institutions such as Freddie Mac), enough to cover 77 per cent of the US budget deficit during fiscal year 2004. Nor were the Japanese alone. Above all China, but also Korea, Taiwan, and other East Asian governments taken together increased their dollar reserves by $465 billion and $507 billion....”

I want to make it clear that Brenner is not really playing a "blame game", in which he tries to point to East Asia as the bad guy. He spends just as much time criticizing American policy for blatantly encouraging this situation (emphasis mine):

The fundamental source of today’s crisis is the steadily declining vitality of the advanced capitalist economies over three decades, business-cycle by business-cycle, right into the present. The long term weakening of capital accumulation and of aggregate demand has been rooted in a profound system-wide decline and failure to recover of the rate of return on capital, resulting largely—though not only--from a persistent tendency to over-capacity, i.e. oversupply, in global manufacturing industries. From the start of the long downturn in 1973, economic authorities staved off the kind of crises that had historically plagued the capitalist system by resort to ever greater borrowing, public and private, subsidizing demand. But they secured a modicum of stability only at the cost of deepening stagnation, as the ever greater buildup of debt and the failure to disperse over-capacity left the economy ever less responsive to stimulus. ...
To stop the bleeding and insure growth, the Federal Reserve Board turned, from
just after mid-decade, to the desperate remedy pioneered by Japanese economic authorities a decade previously, under similar circumstances. Corporations and households, rather than the government, would henceforth propel the economy forward through titanic bouts of borrowing and deficit spending, made possible by historic increases in their on-paper wealth, themselves enabled by record run-ups in asset prices, the latter animated by low costs of borrowing. Private deficits, corporate and household, would thus replace public ones. The key to the whole process would be an unceasing supply of cheap credit to fuel the asset markets, ultimately insured by the Federal Reserve.
As it turned out, easy money was made available throughout the entire subsequent period. The weakness of business investment made for a sharp reduction in the demand by business for credit. East Asian governments’ unending purchases of dollar-denominated assets with the goal of keeping the value of their currencies down, the competitiveness of their manufacturing up, and the borrowing and the purchasing power of US consumers increasing made for a rising supply of subsidized loans. So the real cost of long term borrowing steadily declined. Meanwhile, the US Central Bank made sure that short term interest rates never rose to such an extent as to jeopardize profit-making in the financial markets by reducing the Federal Funds Rate at every sign of trouble. One has therefore witnessed for the last dozen years or so the extraordinary spectacle of a world economy in which the continuation of capital accumulation has come literally to depend upon historic waves of speculation, carefully nurtured and publicly rationalized by state policy makers and regulators—first in equities between 1995 and 2000, then in housing and leveraged lending between 2000 and 2007. What is good for Goldman Sachs--no longer GM--is what is good for America.

What is missing is a solution. He's a historian, so all he's trying to do is give us the history. Fine. I have to admit, I personally don't see much of a realistic solution. What would probably help is an American acceptance that we've lived well beyond our means and are due for a serious reduction in living standards (completely unacceptable politically, of course). What might simultaneously help is China trying to focus more on domestic consumption as a path to future growth rather than continued exports, but I have no clue what their policies on that are. What will likely happen is we will limp on in this manner for some time yet - Asian exporters will keep flooding us with both cheap goods and plenty of money. I imagine that this can't last indefinitely, but I've no idea what the future really holds.